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Abstract—In real-time embedded systems (RTS), failures due
to security breaches can cause serious damage to the system,
the environment and/or injury to humans. Therefore, it is very
important to understand the potential threats and attacks against
these systems. In this paper we present a novel reconnaissance
attack that extracts the exact schedule of real-time systems
designed using fixed priority scheduling algorithms. The attack is
demonstrated on both a real hardware platform and a simulator,
with a high success rate. Our evaluation results show that
the algorithm is robust even in the presence of execution time
variation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Today, real-time embedded systems are used in a variety
of domains such as automotive, medical devices, avionics and
spacecraft and industrial control (e.g., power plants, chemical
plants) to name but a few. Many of these systems are safety-
critical by nature. That is, any problems that deter from the
normal operation of such systems could result in damage to the
system and the environment, and even threaten human safety.
Conventionally, real-time systems (RTS) used custom plat-
forms, software and protocols and were normally not linked
to the external world. As a result, security was typically
not a priority in the design of RTS. However, due to the
drive towards remote monitoring and control facilitated by
the growth of the Internet and increased connectivity, as
well as the rise in the use of common-off-the-shelf (COTS)
components, these traditional assumptions are increasingly
being challenged. This is evident from recent work (e.g., [9],
[13]) that showed that it is easy to attack such systems. The
work also demonstrated that successful attacks against such
systems could lead to problems more serious than just loss of
data or availability because of their critical nature. This has
spurred work on security of RTS, including both defensive
techniques (e.g., [21], [25], [26], [29], [37]–[40]) and attacks
(e.g., [9], [13]). These attacks for the most part leveraged the
lack of authentication in RTS and their communications.
In this paper, we present a novel reconnaissance attack on
RTS that exploits their predictable nature to gather system
behavior information that can be used to launch other attacks.
Reconnaissance is often the first and an important step for
many attacks. For example, the attackers in the case of
Stuxnet [11] were in the system undetected for months to
collect information before launching their attacks. In RTS, any
deviation from the expected behavior is suspicious and easier
to detect in contrast to general purpose systems; attackers must
operate within narrow operational parameters (e.g., stringent
timing and resource constraints) if they are to avoid detection.
This is particularly true in the case of side-channel and covert-
channel attacks. Often such attacks require precise knowledge
of when the victim task is about to execute for the attacker to
achieve high probability of success [3], [20], [23]. In such a
case, the attacker may have the code of the system, but does
not know when the tasks are activated (i.e., task offsets are
unknown) because the attacker may enter the system sometime
after startup. Hence, the ability to accurately reconstruct
the behavior of the system – in this context extracting the
points in time when one or more tasks of interest (victims)
execute, without being detected, would significantly improve
the success of such attacks on RTS. In this work we present
algorithms to extract1 (and hence, leak) the precise schedule
of the system (§III) without perturbing the system behavior (to
reduce the risk of detection)2.
Due to their safety-critical nature, RTS are designed with
great care and significant engineering effort to operate in a
predictable manner. For instance, (a) designers take great care
to ensure that the constituent tasks in such systems execute
in an expected manner [22], (b) their interrupts are carefully
managed [41] and (c) the execution time is analyzed to great
degree at compile time and run-time (e.g., [6], [8], [15]).
However, as we demonstrate, this predictability can be a
double edged sword – it often makes it easier for adversaries
to gauge the behavior of the system with high precision. This
can increase the success rates for certain attacks, e.g., side-
channel [20] and covert-channel attacks [35]. An example that
demonstrates a cache-based side-channel attack, leveraging
this predictable nature, is presented in §II-C.
Our focus here is on hard real-time systems designed around
fixed priority algorithms [7], [22] since these are the most
common class of real-time scheduling algorithms found in
practice today [24]. Also, this class of scheduling algorithms
is most vulnerable to attacks since they are very predictable.
We carry out exhaustive simulations to understand the design
space for the proposed algorithms (§IV-B). Furthermore, we
demonstrate an actual implementation of the attack on a
hardware board (§IV-C) running a real-time operating system.
In summary, the main contributions of this paper are:
1) a reconnaissance attack scheme aimed at extracting the
schedule of fixed-priority, preemptive hard real-time sys-
tems – this involves development of algorithms capable
of reconstructing the schedule of the system (§III);
2) introducing new performance metrics for the precision of
the schedule inference (§IV-A) and evaluating the attack
scheme using exhaustive simulations (§IV-B);
1We use extract and reconstruct interchangeably in this paper.
2A shorter preliminary version of this paper [10] was presented at a
workshop, without archived proceedings.
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3) implementing the attack scheme using a realistic embed-
ded platform (§IV-C);
4) demonstrating one use case where a reconstructed sched-
ule is used to launch other attacks, e.g., a cache-based
side-channel attack (§IV-C4).
II. SYSTEM AND ATTACK MODEL
In this section we first introduce the real-time system model
used in this paper. Next, we discuss the attack model and the
information needed for successfully launching the proposed
attack. A demonstrative system and attack scenarios are given
in the end. For ease of reference, the notation defined for the
ScheduLeak algorithms is summarized in Table I.
Table I: Glossary of the ScheduLeak notation.
Symbol Definition
W busy interval set {ω1, ..., ωm}
ωk a busy interval
sk, lk start time and length of ωk
Jk a job set enclosed in ωk
J
τi
k a subset of Jk consisting of jobs of τi
j
τi
k,h the h
th job in Jτik
σ
τi
k,h, δ
τi
k,h arrival time and start time of j
τi
k,h
R ScheduLeak R(Γ,W ) = J where J =
⋃m
k=1 Jk
ai an arrival window inferred by R (defined in §III-3)
A. Real-time System and Schedule Model
In this paper, a fixed-priority, preemptive hard real-time
system is considered. Such a system contains a task set
Γ = {τ1, ..., τn} consisting of n periodic real-time tasks with
hard deadlines. Each task τi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, is characterized
by pi (period), wceti (worst case execution time), ci (actual
execution time)3 , di (deadline), ai (initial arrival time, known
as task offset) and prii (priority) based on [22]. We model
the schedule of a periodic real-time system within one hyper-
period as a set of intervals HP that consists of two subsets: (i)
a subset of busy intervals W where tasks are under execution
[5] and (ii) a subset of idle intervals ID where there is no
task being executed. Specifically, the busy interval set W
containing m busy intervals is defined as W = {ω1, ..., ωm}.
Each busy interval ωk, 1 ≤ k ≤ m, is characterized by a tuple
(sk, lk, Jk), in which sk and lk are the start time and the
length of ωk, and Jk denotes the job set (instances of tasks)
comprising ωk. We further define the notation Jτik to be the
subset of Jk for τi in ωk, thus Jk =
⋃n
i=1 J
τi
k . The h
th job
in Jτik is then denoted by j
τi
k,h, that is defined by (σ
τi
k,h, δ
τi
k,h)
where στik,h is the arrival time when the job is being scheduled
and δτik,h is the start time when the job begins to execute. δ
τi
k,h
is greater than or equal to στik,h when j
τi
k,h has to wait for
higher-priority tasks executing before it to finish.
B. Attack and Adversary Model
The goal of the adversary in our model is to steal in-
formation while remaining undetected rather than to disable
or disrupt the real-time system. Therefore, reconnaissance to
3We assume that the actual execution time at run time is ci + γi,h, where
γi,h represents the variation (which includes jitters) at the hth job. However,
for simplicity, we will use ci without variation γi,h to illustrate the proposed
algorithm in §III.
obtain knowledge about the system’s operation becomes even
more important than in enterprise settings as attack attempts
or unsuccessful attacks can more easily be detected due to the
deterministic and predictable nature of the system.
We assume that the adversary has a foothold on the real-
time system (the attacker is able to run one or more tasks in the
system) and has knowledge of the system task set Γ. For ex-
ample, in a multi-vendor development model [29], an attacker
may obtain task set information offline by compromising one
of the vendors with weak defenses. Similarly, execution time
distributions, that provide the execution times (and estimated
variations), obtained during WCET analysis – an essential
process in developing a real-time system [6], [8], [15] may
also be obtained offline. A demonstrative avionics system
that exemplifies this model along with an attack scenario are
introduced in §II-C. These assumptions are not unreasonable
as demonstrated by Stuxnet [11], a multi-stage attack in
which the attackers compromised many other systems before
reaching their target system, and in which the attackers stayed
undetected for months conducting reconnaissance on the target
system before they launched their attacks.
However, we also assume that the adversary has no knowl-
edge of the initial arrival time ai for each task. Since initial
arrival times of tasks are subject to the system’s operating
condition, and the adversary’s attack code might have started
sometime after system starts, the values of ai are unknown a
priori to the adversary. Adversary’s goal is to use the known
data (i.e., task sets) to learn the system’s run-time behavior
and operations without being detected. Specifically, our focus
will be on reconstructing the system’s task schedule. This
information can be used to increase the success rate of other
attacks as exemplified by the side-channel attack discussed in
§II-C.
Observer Task: In preemptive RTS, low priority tasks are
particularly useful in monitoring the system’s behavior, e.g.,
for measuring the execution time of the task that preempts
it. Thus, the lowest priority task has the ability to monitor
the schedule of a system by observing its busy intervals W =
{ω1, ..., ωm}. We define such a task as the “observer task”. In
this paper, we assume that an adversary can gain access to an
observer task (i) either by utilizing an existing lowest priority
task or (ii) by inserting a new task with the lowest priority
and infinite period (hence being continuously active). Note the
observed intervals are actually a composite of multiple tasks
thus making it difficult for direct use without further analysis.
Hence, an algorithm to extract Jk from W is required.
C. Demonstrative System and Attack
Avionics Demonstrator: To motivate our research, we use an
example of the Electronic Control Unit (ECU) for an avionics
system as depicted in Figure 1. This system runs many of the
same types of tasks that could be expected in an Unmanned
Aerial Vehicle (UAV) surveillance system [29], [30]. The ECU
communicates locally with the inertial sensors, GPS system
and actuators (“UAV” in the figure), as well as a camera
subsystem. The ECU also uses off-board communication to
exchange information with a base station. We assume that
three parties are involved in building the ECU system: Vendor
1, Vendor 2 and the Integrator. Each party is responsible for a
different ECU subsystem and real-time tasks (See Figure 1).
UAV
Vendor 1 Integrator Vendor 2
Encryption Task
Encoder Task
IO Operation Task
Mission Planner Laws Task
Network Manger Sensor Task
Actuator Task
(from camera)
(to base station)
Unprotected TaskProtected Task
Figure 1: High-level design of an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle.
Targeted Attacks: An attacker who accomplishes the recon-
struction of task schedule is able to pinpoint the arrival instant
and the start instant of any task on a victim system. Here we
introduce an attack that spies upon execution behavior of the
target task with the knowledge of the precise task schedule.
Vendor 2 who manages sensor readings has access to the
UAV coordinates. This vendor, as an adversary, would like
to identify the exact locations of high-interest targets where
the surveillance camera is enabled. The attacker can achieve
that by learning the behavior (e.g., memory usage, execution
modes) of the Encoder Task. For instance, he can launch a
storage-channel-based timing attack to observe the resource
usage of the Encoder Task and learn whether the task is
processing a large amount of data. This attack requires precise
knowledge of system operation as a careless attack can result
in (i) increased noise and less precision in results, or worse (ii)
a real-time task missing its deadline and thus lead to detection.
In this paper, we implement a cache-based side-channel attack
on a hardware board to demonstrate the importance and
usability of the task schedule inference (See §IV-C4).
III. SCHEDULEAK
To effectively extract the system’s task schedule, we propose
“ScheduLeak”, a novel algorithm that uses the predictable,
periodic, nature of hard real-time systems to reconstruct the
schedule. It can be represented as a function R(Γ,W ) = J ,
where R, ScheduLeak algorithm, takes the target system’s task
set Γ and busy interval set W as inputs and produces the
inferred job set J =
⋃m
k=1 Jk. Here, the task set Γ is known
except for the arrival time attribute ai and the busy interval set
W is obtained from the observer task controlled by the attacker
while the details of job set Jk stay unknown. Finally, J allows
the attacker to pinpoint the possible start time of any particular
victim task. The sequence of iterative steps in ScheduLeak are
summarized in Figure 2. A detailed illustration is given next.
Observer Task
Capture a busy interval
Collected
a hyper-period?
Infer task arrival windows
Are arrival 
windows improved?
Decompose busy intervals
Yes
No Eliminate ambiguous estimates
Yes
No
1
2
3
Reconstruct Schedules5
4
Figure 2: Flow of the ScheduLeak algorithm.
1) Capturing Busy Intervals: Recall from §II-B that the
adversary utilizes his observer task to capture busy intervals.
To do so, the observer task checks whether it has been
preempted. When a preemption is detected, a busy interval
ωk is found. The duration between preemptions is lk and the
start time of this busy interval is sk. The detailed mecha-
nism for capturing a busy interval is presented in §IV-C2.
This process of capturing one busy interval repeats until the
observer task collects all busy intervals in one hyper-period
(since the schedule of arrivals repeats every hyper-period).
Eventually, the adversary can get the complete busy interval
set W = {ω1, ..., ωm}. Note that ScheduLeak can also work
with busy intervals observed from fewer or more than one
hyper-period as discussed in §IV-B2
2) Decomposing Busy Intervals: The goal of this step is to
estimate possible job compositions of Jk in each busy interval
ωk. The duration of ωk can be calculated by
lk =
n∑
i=1
(|Jτik | · ci) (1)
where lk and ci are known to the adversary. Therefore, the
problem here can be further refined as finding the number of
jobs |Jτik | for each task τi arriving in ωk.
A task τi may either contribute nothing or contribute one or
more jobs to ωk, i.e., 0 ≤ |Jτik |. But, given the duration lk of
the busy interval, the number of jobs for a task τi depends on
its period pi and execution time ci. Therefore, knowing pi and
ci of every task, we can reduce the number of possibilities for
the combination of Jτik . We use Theorem 1 described below
to either estimate the exact value of |Jτik | or, in the worst case,
reduce the possible candidates for |Jτik | to only 2 values.
Theorem 1. For the task τi, given values of pi, ci, lk:
(i) If lk satisfies (N · pi − ci)+ ≤ lk < N · pi + ci, then ωk
can only contain N jobs for τi.
(ii) If lk satisfies N · pi + ci ≤ lk < (N + 1) · pi− ci, then ωk
can only contain N or N + 1 jobs for τi.
We will use the following two lemmas to prove Theorem 1.
Consider στi0 , σ
τi
1 , σ
τi
2 , · · · as the arrival times of task τi and
define S = {στi0 , στi1 , στi2 , · · · }.
Lemma 1. A busy interval contains the hth job of τi if and
only if it contains στih .
Proof. The hth job of τi will be released at time στih if there
are no higher priority tasks running at that time, or, will be
released immediately after the end of the higher priority tasks.
In both cases, the system is busy from time στih to at least the
finishing time of the hth job of τi. Therefore, a busy interval
which contains στih has the h
th job of τi, and a busy interval
that contains the hth job of τi, should have started at στih or at
a time before στih . (Note that the end point of a busy interval
cannot belong to S). 
Lemma 2. If lk satisfies Npi < lk < (N + 1)pi, N =
0, 1, 2, ..., then task τi can only have arrived N or N + 1
times during the busy interval wk.
Proof. If Npi < lk < (N+1)pi, then wk contains N or N+1
points of S. Therefore, by Lemma 1, task τi can only arrive
N or N + 1 times during the busy interval wk. 
Proof of Theorem 1. (i) If Npi − ci ≤ lk < Npi, then the
busy interval cannot contain N − 1 points from S, otherwise,
task τi should have finished in a time interval less than ci.
Therefore, it exactly contains N points from S.
If Npi ≤ lk < Npi + ci, the start point of the busy interval
cannot belong to S (otherwise, the lk should be at least Npi+
ci), therefore, it exactly contains N points from S. Therefore,
by Lemma 1, in both cases, task τi can only have arrived N
times during the busy interval.
(ii) This part follows from Lemma 2 immediately. 
Note that Theorem 1 presented here does not take execution
time variation in ci into account for ease of exposition. Never-
theless, the theorem can be easily extended to cover variation
by adding tolerance bounds for each variable. Further, our
evaluation (§IV) takes execution time variation into account.
Based on Theorem 1, each task τi, in worst case, may have
two candidate |Jτik | values for a busy interval: N and N + 1.
Therefore, computing the right term in Equation (1) with all
possible |Jτik | values, there will be at most 2n combinations.
Nonetheless, only those combinations that yield exactly lk and
satisfy Equation (1) are shortlisted for further consideration.
Example 1. Consider a task set Γ = {τ1, τ2, τ3} and 4 cap-
tured busy intervals in a hyper-period, i.e., LCM(5, 6, 10) =
30, as follows:
pi ci
τ1 5 1
τ2 6 2
τ3 10 2
W lk Timestamp
ω1 8 [0,8]
ω2 6 [10,16]
ω3 5 [18,23]
ω4 3 [24,27]
Taking busy interval ω4 as an example, by applying Theorem 1
to ω4, we can compute |Jτ14 |, |Jτ24 | and |Jτ34 | values presented
in the left table below. And then we use Equation (1) to
find possible J4 combinations that can lead to the given busy
interval duration l4 = 3 as shown in the table to the right in
the following. As a result, most combinations are eliminated
except the two, {1, 0, 1} and {1, 1, 0}, that can lead to a busy
interval length of l4 = 3. In this case, both inferences will be
retained for further processing.
|Jτi4 |
τ1 0 or 1
τ2 0 or 1
τ3 0 or 1
|Jτ14 | |Jτ24 | |Jτ34 | l4
0 0 0 0
0 0 1 2
0 1 0 2
0 1 1 4
1 0 0 1
1 0 1 3
√
1 1 0 3
√
1 1 1 5
∗desired l4 = 3
3) Inferring Task Arrival Windows: Here, we estimate pos-
sible arrival times for each task. Rather than directly inferring
a point for the arrival time ai, we compute a possible window
for that arrival, that we call arrival window, defined as ai. It
is done by computing each job’s arrival window, defined as
στik,h, in every busy interval and merging the results in the end
for each task.
To identify potential arrival windows στik,h for τi in ωk,
we partition the busy interval ωk = [α, β] into the following
three types of segments for each task τi:
− 0-interval: There is no arrival.
− 1-interval: There exists exactly 1 arrival.
− 0-1-interval: There may exist 0 or 1 arrivals.
The partitioning of the busy interval is done using the follow-
ing theorem.
Theorem 2. Considering a task τi and a busy interval wk that
has start time α and end time β. The partitioning of the busy
interval is done by using the following equations:
(i) If τi has arrived exactly N times:
If N =
⌈ lk
pi
⌉
, the following segments are 1-interval:
στik,h = [α+ (h− 1)pi, β − (N − h)pi − ci] 1 ≤ h ≤ N (2)
Else, the following segments are 1-interval:
στik,h = [β + (N + 1− h)pi, α+ hpi − ci] 1 ≤ h ≤ N (3)
(ii) If τi has potentially arrived either N or N + 1 times:
the following segments are 1-interval:
στik,h = [α+ (h− 1)pi, α+ hpi − ci] 1 ≤ h ≤ N (4)
and the following segments are 0-1-interval:
στik,h = [α+ (h− 1)pi, β − ci] h = N + 1 (5)
where στik,h is the h
th arrival window for τi in ωk. In both
cases, the remainder of the busy interval is 0-interval.
Proof. (i) From Theorem 1, If |Jτik | = N , then (N − 1)pi +
ci ≤ lk ≤ (N + 1)pi − ci. We partition the busy interval as
follows: [α, β] = [α, α+pi]∪[α+pi, α+2pi]∪· · ·∪[α+hpi, β].
If (N−1)pi+ci ≤ lk ≤ Npi, or equivalently, N = d lkpi e, then
h = N−1 and there should be an arrival in each interval of the
partition above. Also, there cannot be an arrival in [β− ci, β],
otherwise, the busy interval cannot terminate at b. Therefore,
there should be an arrival in [α+ (N − 1)pi, β − ci].
By the periodicity assumption, task τi arrives every pi seconds,
i.e., if we have an arrival at time t, then, t± pi is also arrival
times. So, shifting [α+(N −1)pi, β−ci] by integer multiples
of pi to the left and taking its intersection with other intervals
of the partition, we get Equation (2).
If Npi ≤ lk ≤ (N + 1)pi − ci, then h = N and there should
not be any arrivals in the last interval of the partition above.
Hence, because of the periodicity, the last arrival should be
in the interval [β − pi, α + Npi]. But, if there is an arrival
in interval [α + Npi − ci, α + Npi], then there should be an
arrival in the interval [α− ci, α]. Therefore, the busy interval
cannot start at α. This implies that the last arrival should be
in the interval [β − pi, α + Npi − ci]. Finally, because of
the periodicity, by shifting [β − pi, α + Npi − ci] by integer
multiples of pi to the left and taking its intersection with other
intervals of the partition, we get Equation (3).
(ii) Using Theorem 1 again, if |Jτik | = N or N + 1, then
Npi + ci ≤ lk ≤ (N + 1)pi − ci. Therefore, in the partition,
h = N , and we cannot say anything about the last interval
of the partition. So, we mark it as a 0-1-interval, with the
consideration that similar to part (i), there cannot be an arrival
in [β − ci, β]. This gives us Equation (5). Also, there should
be an arrival in all other intervals of the partition, with the
consideration that similar to part (i), there cannot be an arrival
in [α + hpi − ci, α + hpi], for h = 1, .., N . This gives us
Equation (4). 
Figure 3 shows the use of Theorem 2. Part (a) depicts a
case in which |Jτik | = 3 and β− (3−h)pi−ci < α+hpi−ci,
for h = 1, 2, 3. Note that 1-intervals for τi in a busy interval
should be repeated every pi. Part (b) depicts a case in which
|Jτik | = 2 or 3 and we are not able to determine whether the
last interval contains an arrival; hence, it will be a 0-1-interval.
𝜔" 𝑝$
1-interval 1-interval𝛼 𝑝$ 𝑝$𝑐$
0-interval
1-interval
0-interval 0-interval𝛽
(a)
𝜔" 𝑝$
1-interval 0-1-interval
𝑝$ 𝑝$𝑐$
1-interval𝑐$ 𝑐$𝛼 𝛽
(b)
Figure 3: Estimate of arrival time locations.
We then use the above segments to find the initial arrival
window ai for τi. Because of periodicity, a task must arrive
exactly once in each time interval of length equal to its period.
Moreover, without considering jitters, the relative arrival time
in each period should be consistent. Thus, if we divide one
hyper-period into intervals of length pi and overlap them
together, we can obtain a distribution of possible arrival
locations of τi in its period pi. Here, we take the overlapped
segments that have the highest occurrence probability as the
arrival window ai. We will use the following example to
demonstrate how this works.
Example 2. Here we consider task τ3 from Example 1
to demonstrate how the arrival window a3 is derived. By
following Theorem 2, four busy intervals can be partitioned
into segments as shown in Figure 4(a), and the corresponding
overlaps are plotted in Figure 4(b). In this case, there are two
segments that have the highest overlap count, 3, that represent
two possible arrival windows a3 = [0, 1] or a3 = [4, 4] for task
τ3. Similarly, arrival windows for τ1 and τ2 can be computed
as a1 = [0, 0] and a2 = [0, 0], respectively. Figure 4(c) shows
the arrival window for τ2.
4) Eliminating Ambiguous Estimates: As illustrated in Fig-
ure 4(b), the ambiguity in arrival windows is caused by 0-
1-interval segments in each arrival window. In such a case,
if one of the 0-1-interval segments can be confirmed as 1-
interval, then we know the correct arrival window. Since the
estimation of arrival windows relies on 1-interval and 0-1-
interval segments that are computed based on |Jτik | – some of
which may have ambiguous N or N + 1 values, the solution
is to eliminate the ambiguity in |Jτik |. This can be done by
applying the arrival window ai to each busy interval to validate
the estimated |Jτik | values. Figure 5 illustrates the process
of removing mismatched |Jτik | from a busy interval ωk with
ambiguous |Jτik | values by applying inferred arrival windows
ai. The hth arrival window στik,h of τi in ωk is obtained using:
σ
τi
k,h = [ai,begin +
(⌈ sk
pi
⌉
+ h− 1
)
pi, ai,end +
(⌈ sk
pi
⌉
+ h− 1
)
pi]
(6)
where ai,begin and ai,end are the beginning and the end time
points of the initial arrival window ai. Figure 5 considers
the simple case where the arrival window is a continuous
interval (shown by the black rectangle). That is, the results of
the previous step involving the computation of a distribution
are the black rectangles – as expected, they repeat every pi
seconds. Part (a) of this figure shows the case where the arrival
window overlaps with a 0-1-interval. This implies that the
0-1-interval is in fact a 1-interval. Therefore, the inference
becomes N+1. Part (b) shows the case that the arrival window
does not overlap with a 0-1-interval – it implies that the 0-1-
interval is in fact a 0-interval leaving N as the only possibility.
By removing mismatched |Jτik | values, the number of possi-
ble task combinations for that interval is reduced, sometimes
to a unique combination. This reduced set of possible |Jτik |
values is then used to update the arrival windows iteratively
until the values are stabilized (see Figure 2).
Example 3. Consider busy interval ω4 = [24, 27] that has two
possible task composition inferences for {|Jτ14 |, |Jτ24 |, |Jτ34 |}
in Example 1: {1, 0, 1} and {1, 1, 0}. By applying a2 to ω4
as shown in Figure 4(d), we confirm that τ2 should have
arrived one time. This validates the inference of {1, 1, 0} and
eliminates {1, 0, 1}. Once the ambiguity in ω4 is removed,
the only 0-1-interval for inferring a3 in Example 2 can be
identified as 0-interval based on the correct inference {1, 1, 0}.
This leaves the interval on the left in Figure 4(b) as the only
correct arrival window for τ3.
5) Reconstructing Schedules: The final step is to generate
the start time δτik,h of each job to reconstruct the schedule.
We do this by feeding Γ along with inferred arrival times ai
into a compact scheduling translator (to be explained below).
However, at the end of the previously discussed refinement
loop, some tasks may still end up with a wider arrival window
that cannot be narrowed further. To use a compact scheduling
translator, an exact point for each arrival ai is needed. We
propose the beginning point of the first arrival window as the
exact arrival time for such tasks. The reasons are: (i) to make
sure that jobs in a busy interval do not become disconnected
and (ii) since this choice indicates the earliest possible arrival
time of a job, attacks launched using this arrival time will
never miss the job. Once each arrival time ai is determined,
the compact scheduling translator is ready to reconstruct the
schedule. For a selected busy interval ωk, the translator first
calculates στik,h for every involved job by using σ
τi
k,h = ai +(⌈sk
pi
⌉
+ h − 1
)
pi adapted from Equation (6). Then, these
στik,h values can be interpreted as a prearranged arrival queue
where the scheduling translator only processes the given jobs.
The output of this process is the start time δτik,h of each job
within the busy interval ωk.
Figure 6 presents an example of schedule reconstruction
of busy interval ωk in the presence of τi and τi+1 where
|Jτik | = 2, |Jτi+1k | = 3 and prii > prii+1. Part (a) shows
the arrival times of each job that are obtained from arrival
windows and (b) presents the start times output from the
scheduling translator. By repeating this process for all busy
intervals, the full schedule can be reconstructed.
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Figure 4: Example 2 and 3, compute possible arrival windows and validate inferences.
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Figure 6: Translation of start times δτik,h from arrival times σ
τi
k,h in
ωk where prii > prii+1.
IV. EVALUATION
The ScheduLeak algorithm has been implemented in a
simulation platform as well as on a hardware board running a
real-time operating system. The simulator is used to explore a
larger design space while the implementation on the hardware
board demonstrates the feasibility of carrying out such attacks
on realistic systems. In this section, we first propose metrics
that can be used to evaluate the performance of our algorithms.
We then present an evaluation of the algorithm on both
simulation engines and hardware board implementation.
A. Performance Metrics
One way to evaluate the performance of such algo-
rithms is to compare the schedules from the output with
that from the ground truth. Let the actual start times for
τi be {δτi1 ∗, · · · , δτiu ∗} and the estimated start times be{δτi1 , · · · , δτiu }. Let E(τi)r = δτir ∗−δτir be the error in estimat-
ing the start time of the rth appearance of task τi. Therefore,
for task τi we have the errors E(τi) = {E(τi)1, · · · , E(τi)u}.
We define the standard deviation of these errors from zero as
SDi =
√
1
u
∑s
r=1(E(τi)r)
2. We can now define the precision
of the estimation of the start time of task τi as (1− SDipi ) where
pi is the period of task τi. This value is a number in [0, 1]
where 1 indicates an exact estimation of the start times. For
a task set containing n tasks, we define the overall precision
ratio of the algorithm as the arithmetic mean of the estimation
precision of tasks in the set, as follows:
η′ =
1
n
n∑
i=1
(1− SDi
pi
) (7)
B. Simulation-based Evaluation
1) Simulation Setup: The ScheduLeak approach was evalu-
ated using both an internally developed scheduling simulation
tool and real hardware. The simulation tool was used to test
the scalability of the algorithm and also to test with a more
diverse set of real-time task combinations.
Task Set Generation: We apply ScheduLeak to randomly
generated synthetic task sets and check whether the inference
of start times matches the corresponding ground truth. The task
sets are grouped by utilization from [0.001+0.1·x, 0.1+0.1·x]
where 0 ≤ x ≤ 9. For example, the [0.501, 0.6] group contains
the task sets that occupy 50.1% to 60% of CPU utilization.
Each utilization group consists of 6 subgroups that have a fixed
number of tasks from 10 to 15 respectively. Each subgroup
contains 100 task sets. In other words, 600 task sets are
generated in each utilization group resulting in 6000 task sets
to test for one graph. For ease of comparison, we generate task
sets with periods that are computed from the factors selected
from [2, 3, 5, 7, 11, 13]. Note that The resulting task set may
contain some tasks that are harmonic. Then, the initial arrival
time (i.e., task offset) for a task is randomly selected between
0 and the task’s period (i.e., 0 ≤ ai < pi).
Scheduling Algorithm: We use the commonly used rate-
monotonic algorithm [22] to assign the priorities of tasks, i.e.,
a task with a shorter period is assigned a higher priority. We
only pick those task sets that are schedulable by fixed-priority
scheduling algorithms.
Execution Time Variation: We use normal distribution to
produce execution time variation. A task set is first generated
from the aforementioned task set generator that guarantees
schedulability. Then, for a task τi, the average execution time
ci is computed by ci = wceti · 80%, where 80% is chosen
empirically. Next, we fit a normal distribution N (µ, σ2) for
the task τi. We let the mean value µ be ci and find the standard
deviation σ with which the cumulative probability P (X ≤
wceti) is 99.99%. As a result, such a normal distribution
produces variation of which 95% are within ±10% ·wceti. To
not violate the schedulability, we adjust the deviated execution
time to be WCET if it exceeds WCET.
2) Simulation Results: We examine the factors affecting
the performance of the ScheduLeak algorithm. We test the
algorithm with task sets generated under the criteria introduced
in §IV-B1 (unless stated otherwise) and evaluate the precision
ratio using Equation (7).
Empirical Baseline of Inference Precision: To understand
how the precision ratio can reflect the correctness of infer-
ences, we compare the ScheduLeak algorithm with a naive
algorithm – the initial arrival times are inferred by choosing
random time points. Figure 7 shows that the naive algorithm
yields inference precision ratios ranging from 0.04 to 0.45 –
this means that an inferred start time instant has an error over
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Figure 7: A naive algorithm that infers initial arrival times by
selecting random time points gives an empirical lower bound of the
inference precision ratio. X-axis represents the utilization group, and
Y-axis is the corresponding precision ratio.
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Figure 8: The comparison of the impact on the inference precision
between different degrees of execution time variation. The blue line
(middle) is the variation configuration used throughout the other
experiments in this section.
55% of the period of the corresponding task when compared
to the actual instant. It also implies that an attacker may miss
an entire computation interval of the victim task and target
the wrong interval. In contrast, when using the ScheduLeak
algorithm, the inference precision ratio remains high, leading
to an average of 0.95 in precision ratio. This represents an
average deviation of 5% (or less) between an inferred start
time and the actual start time.
Impact of Execution Time Variation: To understand the
extent to which execution time variation impacts the inference
precision of the ScheduLeak algorithm, we carried out simu-
lations without execution time variations. We compare such a
case with the condition that involves execution time variations
produced by the normal distribution where µ = wceti · 80%
and P (X ≤ wceti) = 99.99% introduced in §IV-B1 (this
is also the configuration used by other simulation experiments
presented in this section). We also generate another worse case
with µ = wceti · 60% and P (X ≤ wceti) = 99.99% for
comparison. The results displayed in Figure 8, suggest that
the ScheduLeak algorithm performs better when there is no
execution time variation (the red line). It yields 1.0 precision
ratio in 51.2% of the tested task sets with an overall mean
precision ratio of 0.979. It’s worth nothing that it does not
reach 1.0 precision ratio for all task sets because some may
contain harmonic tasks which make it hard to distinguish them
when reconstructing. Since having constant execution times
is the best case for ScheduLeak, we consider this graph an
empirical upper bound of the inference precision ratio when
a full hyper-period is observed. Additionally, the figure shows
that larger variation leads to lower inference performance.
Nevertheless, it also suggests that the ScheduLeak algorithm
can tolerate wide variations. It yields an average precision ratio
of 0.95 in µ = wceti·80% while it is 0.929 in µ = wceti·60%.
Impact of Task Set Utilization: Next, we analyze how the
Figure 9: Detailed data of the µ = wceti ·80% graph in Figure 8. X-
axis is the utilization of the task sets, and Y-axis is the corresponding
inference precision. A heavier color indicates higher occurrence.
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Figure 10: The inference precision of varied number of tasks. X-axis
represents the group of task sets categorized by the number of tasks
in a task set. Y-axis is the corresponding inference precision.
utilization of the real-time task sets can affect the precision
of our analysis. The precision ratios for each utilization group
are plotted in Figure 8 (the blue line). Raw precision ratios
for each task set are provided in Figure 9, and the statistical
data is summarized in Table II. From the figures, we observe
that the precision ratio decreases as the utilization decreases.
It is because lower utilizations may indicate (i) potentially
shorter execution times and (ii) smaller and scattered busy
intervals – both of which are detrimental to our analyses.
If a task’s execution time is smaller than any other task’s
variation, it can cause the algorithm to falsely filter out such
a short task when decomposing a busy interval, resulting
in inaccurate inferences. Further, small and scattered busy
intervals reduce the probability that an inferred arrival time
can successfully land within the busy interval. Under such cir-
cumstances, ScheduLeak can’t resolve certain inferences.This
false negative is due to the fact that the algorithm only
considers the beginning point of an inferred arrival window
when reconstructing the schedule of a busy interval (as stated
in §III-5). This ambiguity influences the inference precision
the most when the busy interval is short.
Table II: Summary of the inference precision for each utilization
group plotted in Figure 9.
Utilization Mean SD Min Median Max
[0.0,0.1] 0.9211 0.0517 0.6846 0.9210 1
[0.1,0.2] 0.9275 0.0498 0.7403 0.9285 1
[0.2,0.3] 0.9290 0.0538 0.7772 0.9289 1
[0.3,0.4] 0.9407 0.0557 0.7499 0.9466 0.9999
[0.4,0.5] 0.9555 0.0495 0.8047 0.9692 0.9999
[0.5,0.6] 0.9606 0.0483 0.7281 0.9832 0.9998
[0.6,0.7] 0.9665 0.0447 0.7576 0.9977 0.9997
[0.7,0.8] 0.9728 0.0405 0.7386 0.9975 0.9996
[0.8,0.9] 0.9737 0.0379 0.8008 0.9968 0.9993
[0.9,1.0] 0.9722 0.0398 0.8005 0.9958 0.9991
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Figure 11: Impact of observation duration on precision ratio. The
precision ratio gets improved as more schedule data is collected.
Furthermore, from the zoomed diagram in Figure 9 and Ta-
ble II we also observe that the maximum and median precision
ratios decrease slightly at high utilizations. It is because higher
utilizations lead to larger busy intervals. Consequently more
ambiguous conditions show up while trying to estimate the
number of arrivals in a busy interval, making it difficult for
the ScheduLeak algorithm to arrive at a correct inference.
Impact of the Number of Tasks: Another factor that may
affect the precision ratio is the number of tasks in a task
set. We compute mean precision ratios for 15 subgroups that
have the number of tasks ranging from 1 to 15 and see
whether it influences the precision. The result are presented in
Figure 10. It shows that the more tasks involved in a system,
the harder the ScheduLeak algorithm can correctly infer the
schedules. It is because having more tasks in a system means
potentially more tasks may be involved in a busy interval.
It also implies that there can be more possible combinations
for the composition of a busy interval, which increases the
difficulty of the analysis from ScheduLeak.
Impact of Observation Duration: In the previous experi-
ments, we fed ScheduLeak with busy intervals observed from
a full hyper-period. However, since busy intervals are analyzed
in a discrete fashion in ScheduLeak, it is also possible to
process the algorithms with busy intervals observed from fewer
or more than a full hyper-period. To evaluate the impact of
observation duration, we let ScheduLeak observe different
proportions of the schedule and collect busy intervals within
the observation duration. The busy intervals that are not
complete at the edge are discarded. The proportion we examine
here ranges from 10% to 200% of a hyper-period. The results
are shown in Figure 11. From the figure, we can see that
ScheduLeak yields a precision ratio of 0.58 when observing
10% of a hyper-period. If we only compute the corresponding
precision ratio for the busy intervals within the observation
duration, we get a precision ratio of 0.77 when observing
10% of a hyper-period. In both cases, the inference precision
gets higher as more portions of the schedule are observed. It’s
worth mentioning that the inference precision is improved even
after collecting over 100% of a hyper-period. It is due to the
nature of normal distributions where the variation around the
mean point has high occurrence probability. That is, as more
data is sampled, the variation can be neutralized, resulting
in the ScheduLeak algorithm’s ability to infer more accurate
arrival windows and start points.
C. Zedboard-based Evaluation
1) Zedboard Setup: We implemented the ScheduLeak al-
gorithm on an ARM-based development board, the Zedboard
[2]. The processor runs at 666.67MHz and drives a shared
64-bit Global Timer (GT) that is clocked at ≈ 333.3MHz. We
tested our implementation with a variety of different task sets,
starting from the UAV model (Figure 1 and §II-C) to many
synthetic task sets. The task sets ran on a real-time operating
system, FreeRTOS – a lightweight and open source real-time
kernel [1]. It is powered by a priority-based preemptive real-
time scheduler. To obtain “ground truth”, the FreeRTOS kernel
has been modified to record time stamps for context switches.
2) Implementation: We introduce how the observer task
captures busy intervals as this step is hardware-dependent.
The Global Timer (GT) that is accessible to user tasks in
FreeRTOS is used as a time reference to capture busy intervals.
As mentioned above, GT is clocked at 333.3MHz, hence
its resolution can be computed as 1/333.3MHz ≈ 3ns.
To capture a busy interval, the observer task uses GT as a
reference to inspect whether or not it has been preempted.
The observer task reads GT in a loop and compares it with the
time stored from last read. If nothing preempts the observer
task during the loop, then the difference for times between
consecutive loops remains below one unit of the loop execution
time (time measurement is presented in §IV-C3). In contrast, if
the difference is greater than expected, then a preemption must
have occurred. The observer task repeats the same process
until it collects all busy intervals for at least one hyper-period.
After that, the program moves to the busy interval analysis
stage. The granularity of the observer task measurements is
further discussed in the next part.
3) Zedboard-based Results: Observer Task Overhead:
We first examine the execution cost of the observer task and its
impact on the ability to capture busy intervals. Our observer
task uses a loop to read time values from the Global Timer.
The shortest busy interval that can be measured depends on
the cost of reading the timer and executing the observer task
instructions. The cost of each read loop measures 447ns,
on average, in the absence of preemption. This is really
small compared to the execution times of real-time tasks
which are typically more than 10µs. The Global Timer counts
447ns/3ns ≈ 149 times during each read loop. On the
other hand, a small busy interval with just one task that has
execution time of 10µs will result in the counter incrementing
10µs/3ns ≈ 3333 times. Hence, it is very unlikely that the
observer task will miss any busy intervals.
The actual cost for capturing a busy interval varies since
the timing now involves a pair of context switches. From
our experiments a pair of context switches takes 18.03µs
on average on this board. This adds to the length of any
busy interval but the costs are bounded as each measurement
only includes two read loops. We can confidently remove
these costs from every busy interval. This leaves only jitters
as a source of uncertainty in our measurements. From our
experiments, removing the observer task costs results in a
0.28µs error, on average, for each busy interval. If the delta
due to this error is greater than the execution time for the
shortest task then it introduces uncertainty into our analysis
since we cannot separate it from a legitimate task. In practice,
this depends on the actual application. For the UAV model
presented earlier on, the shortest task (the Network Manager)
has an execution time of 30µs – two orders of magnitude
higher than the error/delta. Hence, the errors in measuring the
busy intervals did not really impact our analyses.
On-board Analysis Overhead: It is important to note that the
analysis of busy intervals need not necessarily be performed
online. For some attack scenarios, the data can be analyzed
offline. Hence, the analysis will not be limited by the perfor-
mance of the hardware. In this section though, we focus on
the overheads for carrying out the analysis on the actual board
to demonstrate the feasibility of online analysis.
The estimate of |Jτik | uses Equation (1) to find the matching
combinations for a busy interval. This has order of 2n time
complexity. However, the number of tasks is often fixed for
a task set, thus 2n is bounded in a given real-time system.
On Zedboard, a 10-task task set costs 58.94ms in the worst
case to process all possible combinations for a busy interval.
Calculating arrival windows depends on the number of job
instances of each task in a hyper-period. From our experiments
on average, it takes 2.073ms to calculate arrival windows for
the 10-task task set mentioned above where each task executes
for around 10.5µs. For the elimination of mismatched |Jτik |
values it takes arrival windows of n tasks to inspect each
estimate in every busy interval. This has a complexity in the
order of n. In the same experiment as above, it takes 17.4us to
iterate through 14 busy intervals with 10 arrival windows from
the correspondent 10 tasks. Finally, for a task set with 10 tasks
that have 14 busy intervals on our Zedboard, it takes 828.05ms
to complete the total analysis. In this test case, ScheduLeak
yields a precision ratio of 0.9977.
4) Implications of ScheduLeak: We now demonstrate an
attack that takes advantage of the task schedule information
obtained using ScheduLeak by implementing the attack case
introduced in §II-C. In particular we use a cache-based side-
channel attack [19], [27], [28] (as an instance of storage-
channel-based timing attacks) to precisely gauge the cache
usage of a victim task, in this case the image encoder task. The
cache-based side-channel attack is launched from a periodic
task that has the highest priority (as opposed to the observer
task that uses the lowest priority). With the schedule informa-
tion, we carefully place the cache prime and probe steps [27]
before and after the image encoder task begins and ends. We
let the attacker task halt the attack if we know that the victim
task will not appear in the next period. Figure 12(a) displays
the result of this attack. It shows that the cache-based side-
channel attack with schedule information can effectively filter
out unnecessary information and preserve the cache usage
behavior of the victim task. On the other hand, Figure 12(b)
demonstrates the case where the attacker has no knowledge of
the task schedule. The attacker then has to launch the cache-
based side-channel attack in every period randomly. As a
result, the obtained cache usage contains too much noise from
other tasks, making it difficult to obtain useful information.
V. DISCUSSION
We evaluated the algorithm by varying four variables: (i)
execution time variation, (ii) CPU utilization, (iii) the number
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Figure 12: A demonstration of the advantage of a targeted attack.
X-axis represents sample points and Y-axis is the estimated cache
usage. Top part shows a successful cache side-channel attack targeting
a specific victim task with the knowledge of precise task schedule.
Bottom part shows that a careless attack leads to unusable information
due to too much noise.
of tasks (iv) observed duration. From the results, we can
conclude that the following factors may influence the inference
precision: Execution Time Variation: Large execution time
variation can reduce the precision of the inference. As shown
in Figure 8, the ScheduLeak algorithms yield an average
precision ratio of 0.95 and 0.929 in µ = wceti · 80% and
µ = wceti ·60% respectively. The Number of Tasks: Having
more tasks in a system means more possible combinations in
decomposing a busy interval. The precision ratio decreases
as the number of tasks increases, as shown in Figure 10.
Busy Interval Length: A short busy interval reduces the
probability that an inferred arrival time can successfully land
within the busy interval. This mostly happens when the task
set utilization is low, which decreases the inference precision.
Task Set Utilization: Higher utilization represents larger busy
intervals and more tasks involved in one individual busy
interval, leading to increased uncertainty. This results in a
decrease of overall inference precision. Observed Duration:
The ScheduLeak algorithms can work with capturing just a
portion of the task schedule. Accumulating more busy interval
observation can improve the inference precision. This is also
true when more than one hyper-period is observed.
VI. RELATED WORK
Recent work on RTS security has demonstrated the fea-
sibility of information leakage via scheduling. Son et al.
[32] highlighted the susceptibility of RM schedulers to covert
timing channel attacks. Vo¨lp et al. [35] presented modifica-
tions to fixed-priority scheduling, altering thread blocks that
potentially leak information with the idle thread to avoid the
exploitation of timing channels. Vo¨lp et al. [34] examined
shared-resource covert channels in real-time schedules and
addressed it by modifying resource locking protocols.
Kadloor et al. [18] introduces a methodology for quanti-
fying side-channel leakage for first-come-first-serve and time-
division-multiple-access schedulers. Gong and Kiyavash [14]
analyzed deterministic work-conserving schedulers. They dis-
covered a lower bound for the total information leakage.
The collaborative version of this problem where two users
form a covert channel in a shared scheduler to steal private
information from a secure system is studied by Ghassami
et al. [12]. While in these works the attacker uses traffic
analysis to obtain information about the user activities, our
work is primarily concerned with reconstructing the original
task schedule as a stepping to stone to other stealthy attacks.
Mohan et al. [26] considered the problem of direct infor-
mation leakage between real-time tasks through architectural
resources such as shared cache. They introduced a modified
fixed-priority scheduling algorithm that integrates security
levels into scheduling decisions. Pellizzoni et al. [29] extended
the above scheme to a more general task model and also pro-
posed an optimal priority assignment method that determines
the task preemptibility.
Cache-based side-channels contain the highest bandwidth
among all side-channels, making them invaluable for informa-
tion leakage [19], [27], [28]. The growth of cloud computing
has caused such attacks face increased scrutiny (e.g., [16],
[31]). Wang and Lee [36] presented a hardened cache model to
mitigate side-channels by adopting partitioning and memory-
to-cache mapping randomization techniques. However, most
existing methods aimed at reducing leakage through cache-
based side-channels have not considered real-time systems.
While other methods of side-channel attacks exist such as
power, electromagnetic and frequency analysis [4], [17], [33],
they are not the focus of this paper.
VII. CONCLUSION
The methods presented here will improve the design of
future real-time systems. Designers will have an increased
awareness of attack mechanisms that leak crucial information
in such systems. Hence, they can develop methods that prevent
or at least reduce the effectiveness of such attacks.
We intend to further refine the algorithms presented here
and also develop solutions to deter such attacks. We believe
that the area of security for real-time systems will require
the development of a large body of work, along multiple
directions, to ensure the overall safety of such systems.
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